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Chapter One
Introduction
Phishing and Cybersecurity
Over the past decade, as more e-commerce is conducted and more people’s
personal information is stored online, cybercrime has increased dramatically. According
to the IC3 (internet crime complaint center), online fraud has increased from 16,775
complaints in 2001 to 119,457 complaints in 2012 (ICC, 2001, 2012). These attacks arise
from error, either by computers failing to filter a threat or the human user failing to
recognize a threat. The largest source of error, and therefore the weakest link in cyber
security, may be the human element (Cranor, 2008; Schneier, 2000).
A popular way to attack someone’s personal information is via a phishing attack
(Forte, 2009). A phishing attack occurs when a cybercriminal impersonates a trusted
entity, such as a bank, in order to influence the target to disclose sensitive information
(i.e., bank account number or social security number). Forte (2009) details three steps in
creating a phishing attack. The first is to create a website that mimics a trusted entity,
such as a bank or auction website. The second is to upload the malicious webpage either
by publishing onto their website or taking advantage of vulnerabilities of the website they
are imitating. The third phase is to email the website link to potential targets either by
mass emailing (i.e., phishing) or specifically targeted emails (i.e., spear phishing). When
phishermen mass mail, they must create an email address from which to send the attack.
They can do this either by creating an ad hoc account or by obtaining an email address
1

from the web (e.g., hotmail). Forte asserts that the ad hoc account is a more effective
strategy because the attackers can use the name of the institution/entity they are trying to
imitate, thus making the attack look more official.
Once the account has been created, the attackers create a mailing list of potential
targets. They do this by sending out crawlers. Crawlers are tools used for targeted
searches of websites for email addresses. An easy way for one to avoid having their email
address collected by these crawlers is never to disclose their email address on a forum or
social networking website (Forte, 2009). Unfortunately, it is impossible to conduct any
kind of business or communication online without posting an email address, and attackers
can still find the email addresses of even the most careful users. This is why security
measures have been set in place to protect people’s information.
Blythe, Petrie, and Clark (2011) studied different tactics that phishermen use, as
well as specific strategies untrained users use in determining whether an email is phishing
or not. An effective strategy used by attackers is displaying official looking logos in their
emails. Some used a conversational or humorous style that would disarm their targets.
Phishermen could also replace similar-looking characters in a web URL, so that they can
register the domain name, but still look official. For example, in paypal.com, the
lowercase “L” can be replaced with a numeral “1” or capital “I” (depending on font) and
register paypa1.com.
There are three ways to combat phishing attacks: Automatic processes such as
email filters, warnings within the computer, and user training (Cranor, 2008). Filters are
effective but not 100% fool-proof (Ma, Saul, Savage, & Voelker, 2009), and scammers
are constantly forming new strategies and methods to circumvent these. Warnings are

2

useful and often protect users from continuing onto known phishing websites, but are
subject to error and false positives, which can cause the warnings not to be heeded. Also
people are likely to disregard a warning if it is passive or if the website/link was given to
them by a trusted or familiar entity (Egelman, Cranor, & Hong, 2008). For these
instances, it is important to have another effective line of defense, and that is where user
training fits into the model.
User Training
User training and education are effective when filters and warnings do not work
(Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2010). This way, the source of the
problem, the human, is trained to recognize evidence of phishing attacks on the occasions
the filters and warnings do not catch the attack. There are many different types of
training, ranging from short games to month-long training exercises.
A simple and engaging way to train people to recognize phishing attacks is by
playing interactive games. Certain games like Anti Phishing Phil (Sheng et al., 2007) and
CyberCIEGE (Cone, Irvine, Thompson, & Nguyen, 2007) teach people to recognize
phishing attacks and manage security networks. These tools can be helpful because they
give a hands-on learning experience.
Sheng et al. (2007) developed a training program called “Anti-Phishing Phil” and
tested its effectiveness in helping people identify phishing and non-phishing emails
compared to other training materials. Anti-Phishing Phil is a short game that takes about
10-15 minutes to complete. It trains the users to recognize phishing URLs and distinguish
them from legitimate URLs in two minute game rounds. Between rounds, a comic
appears explaining other ways that people phish and strategies for identifying a phishing

3

URL. The researchers found that the online training program improved participants’
ability to recognize phishing emails and reduced the number of “false positives” (i.e.,
labeling non-phishing emails as phishing) better than the other available training
programs. Many training programs are effective at reducing false negatives, but many
people overcompensate and report everything they are unsure of as phishing (Blythe et
al., 2011). A question pertaining to our current research is whether this training would be
as effective if the participants were pressured to conform to a group contradicting the
training information.
Wright and Marett (2010) examined different causes for people falling victim to
phishing attacks. In their research, students learned about “security research” and were
given an individual code. Each participant’s code was placed in a sealed envelope with
the university seal on it with the name and student number of the participants. The
envelope said “Do Not Disclose This Code.” The code would be an easy to remember
alphanumeric code (e.g., 76paris). They were then presented with a series of steps to
ensure no one accidentally disclosed their code and that all participants understood the
consequences of disclosure (e.g., affect the grade in the class, violate the student conduct
code). In an eight week class, students were taught about cybersecurity and phishing.
Students were also given a 15 item questionnaire to check their awareness of security
concepts. After eight weeks, the students were asked to disclose their code in a phishing
type scenario. Within a week, 33% responded with their actual code. Those with high
computer self-efficacy or more web experience were less likely to disclose their
information. Therefore it can be surmised that phishing attacks are less effective against
those with high computer self-efficacy or more web experience.
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Similar, but more long-term training programs, are used by the United States
military schools (Coronges, Dodge, Mukina, Radwick, Shevchick, & Rovira, 2012;
Dodge, Carver, & Ferguson, 2007). The cadets received training throughout the duration
of their academic careers. As the cadets received more training, the more effective they
became at recognizing attacks. By the time the cadets reached their senior year, only a
handful failed the training exercise and fell victim to the attacks. This extensive training
program demonstrates how effective training is in helping people identify phishing
attacks, and shows a capacity for long-term retention.
Informational Conformity
Cybercriminals are inventing new ways to steal people’s information and many
use psychological techniques (e.g., Nigerian Billionaire scam) in order to achieve that
goal (Cialdini, 2004; Forte, 2009; Kumaraguru et al., 2010). The core goal of a
phisherman is to gain compliance via an information request. Goldstein, Griskevicius,
and Cialdini (2007) studied different ways to gain compliance. They tested the
effectiveness of persuading hotel guests to reuse their towels. Using several different
strategies in order to gain this compliance, they found that giving altruistic reasons (i.e., it
will help the environment) were more effective strategies than reasons that help the hotel
(i.e., it will save the hotel money). However, the most effective strategy was to inform
people that the other guests were also reusing their towels. The guests would conform to
what was perceived to be normal for the guests of that hotel, and that was more effective
than any other strategy used.
The earliest definitions of conformity assert that it comes from one of two
motivations, informational or normative (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). This research will
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focus on informational conformity, which pertains to people not having the knowledge to
make an informed decision about how to act, so they follow others’ behaviors. The first
documented study demonstrating informational conformity was conducted by Sherif
(1937). He used the autokinetic phenomenon in which people will believe they see a
stationary point of light move in a dark room because of fatigue of the visual system and
a lack of other reference points. The perceived amount of movement would vary from
person to person or from group to group. In his study, participants reported how far the
point of light would move. When participants in the conformity study were first put into
groups, the confederate would establish a group norm of movement (ranging from 1-3
inches to 7-9 inches). When the same participants were then asked to judge the
movement in an individual session, they would use the same norms as established from
the first session.

The participants were unaware that they were influenced by the

establishment of a set range in the first trial, but would consistently say the movement
was within the range of movement provided by the confederate. When the confederate
made a choice on how far the light moved, the participant would model their decisions
after the initial choice. They would do so even when the confederate would drastically
change the range they gave in the middle of the task.
This effect of informational conformity is supported by many famous studies
including those of Latane and Darley (1968) and of Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowitz
(1969). Latane and Darley (1968) had participants wait in a room and fill out paperwork
under the guise of it being necessary before the experiment began. After a few minutes
of waiting, smoke would pour into the room and participants, not knowing what to do,
would look to others (who were confederates) for cues on how to respond. When the
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confederates acted as though the smoke was not a threat, so did the participants.
Milgram, et al., (1969) had groups of various sizes look up into an office building on a
busy New York street. They found that most passersby would stop to look up in the same
direction when the original group consisted of five or more people.
Other research shows that although people may conform after someone deviates
from the established norm, the more successful conformity conditions are when the norm
remains consistent and everyone follows the established rules. Burnkrant and Cousineau
(1975) demonstrated informational conformity in the context of consumer choice.
Participants rated the taste of an instant coffee and were exposed to the purported ratings
of other participants. The researchers manipulated the consistency of raters’ responses,
and found that the more consistent the ratings given, the more likely the participants were
to rate the coffee the same way.
Guadagno, Muscanell, Rice, and Roberts (2013) examined how conformity works
in an online context. Participants received a request to volunteer for a campus-wide
clothing drive online where they could see other participants’ responses. In reality the
clothing drive and the other participants’ responses were fictional. Participants were more
likely to volunteer for the clothing drive when they saw other people were volunteering
as well, but were less likely when people responded “no.” Thus the results indicate that,
even online, people are susceptible to informational conformity.
In our experiment, participants were tasked with determining whether a presented
email is phishing or not. The conformity information presented to half of the participants
was expected to affect the accuracy and confidence in the participants’ choice. We
hypothesized that participants who were not trained to spot phishing attacks and were
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presented with other participants’ choices would use informational conformity to make
their selections, while those who are trained would use their training to make their
selections. The information about others’ choices indicated that they chose non-phishing.
Previous research states that, when in doubt, people assume a given email or URL is
phishing. By indicating that an email is not phishing, it was less likely that participants
would select the email as phishing every time, and thus we should have avoided a ceiling
effect.
Signal detection theory pertains to the threshold of finding and missing a given
signal (in this case a threat). There are four potential outcomes in signal detection, a
correct identification, a correct rejection, a false alarm, and a miss (Macmillian, 2002).
This applies to our research because our study measures the accuracy of potential choices
as a way of measuring learning from the training program and disruption from
conformity. When a potential victim is unsure whether an email is phishing or not people
are more likely to indicate that an email is phishing, thus increasing the rate of false
alarms.
Current Research
Design
This study has a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 design with the between subjects variables being
user training (present vs. absent), conformity information (present vs. absent), and form
(A vs. B) and the within subjects variable being type of email (phishing vs. nonphishing). The dependent variables are performance (i.e., accepting legitimate emails and
rejecting phishing emails), non-phishing choices, and confidence of participants during
the identification task. The reason non-phishing choices is a variable is because the
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conformity information presented will disclose to the participant that the emails were
rated by others as non-phishing. This will be more likely to demonstrate an effect
because, when in doubt, untrained, uninformed people in a phishing experiment context
likely err on the side of caution and treat an email as phishing (Kumaraguru et al., 2010).
Therefore the number of times a participant rates an email as non-phishing is the best
way to measure if they are conforming to the information or not.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The training program will improve participants’ ability to identify phishing
emails compared to those who received no training, resulting in more hits.
Hypothesis 2: User training will increase participants’ levels of confidence in their
choices, compared to those in the no training condition.

Hypothesis 3: People in the no training condition will be most likely to indicate that an
email is not phishing (conform) when presented with information that the majority of
participants indicated that an email is not phishing as well, compared to those who did
not receive conformity information. This will result in more misses.

Hypothesis 4: Inaccurate conformity information (i.e., indicated as non-phishing when it
in fact is phishing) will decrease levels of confidence in choices made by participants
with training compared to those who did not receive training, because those who did not
receive training do not know enough to be conflicted.
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Chapter Two
Method
Participants
Participants were 91 undergraduate introductory psychology students at a
southeastern university. Eighty-five percent were 18-24 years of age, eight percent were
25-34, three percent were 35-44, two percent were 45-54 and two percent were 55-64.
Seventy-three percent were female, twenty-six percent were male, and one percent did
not report their gender. Seventy-four were Caucasian, eighteen percent were Black, two
percent were Asian, five percent were from multiple races, and one percent did not report
their ethnicity. Participants were compensated with course credit. APA ethical guidelines
were used and the IRB approved the methods of which we conducted this
study(APPENDIX A).
Materials
We used a preliminary questionnaire to determine prior knowledge about phishing
emails (APPENDIX B). The questionnaire was developed by the experimenter and was
used as a covariate in the analysis when measuring the number of correct responses
because previous knowledge of phishing URLs could possibly effect participants’
performance in the email identification task. The questionnaire was posted on
surveymonkey.com, which is a website where people can create and distribute surveys
online. We used the program Anti-Phishing Phil
(http://wombatsecurity.com/antiphishingphil) to train participants to spot malicious URLs
10

within emails. The program is a 10 minute training game that has users determine
whether a URL is phishing or not (Figure 2.1). The game also uses short comics
and scenes to help describe the anatomy and motivations of a phishing attack
(Figure 2.2)

Figure 2.1 Anti-Phishing Phil game portion with teachable moment

Figure 2.2. Anti-Phishing Phil comic portion between levels
11

We used the online puzzle game Fishdom (http://www.games.com/play/playrixentertainment/fishdom) (Figure 2.3) for our control activity. Fishdom is an underwater
themed puzzle game similar to Bejeweled or Hexic, where the player must match three
shapes in order to score points.

Figure 2.3 Fishdom game, used for control condition

For both games, we told participants that this game is useful in stimulating brain
activity and those who perform well on this task tend to perform well on the following
task.
For the email stimuli, we used emails either found online, from the inbox of, or
generated by the experimenter. There were two versions (phishing and non-phishing) of
the six emails used in the experiment, and they were split into two different surveys
(Form A and form B) (Figure 2.4). Usually, we used a real phishing email and for the
non-phishing counterpart we changed the URL and removed the phishing indicators. Half
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of these emails were phishing and half were legitimate. The two email sets are parallel
with each other, with the exception that one has phishing indicators and phishing URLs
and the other does not for a given source.

Figure 2.4 The Form A and B version of our emails depicting previous participant
data. The left depicts a non-phishing email and the right depicts a phishing email.
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Procedure
Due to the layout of the computer room in which the experiment was held,
multiple people participated at the same time, but they did not interact with each other. In
order to avoid suspicion from the participant and tipping them off that they were in the
control group or not, everyone in a given time slot was given the same manipulation. For
example all participants in an 8:30 session would receive training but no conformity
manipulation, and then the 9:00 participants would not receive training but would receive
the conformity information.
First, participants were given the definition of a phishing attack and were tasked
with filling out a questionnaire on surveymonkey.com testing their previous knowledge
of phishing attacks and how to identify them. Upon completion, half of the participants
were instructed to play the training game Anti-Phishing Phil and half were instructed to
play Fishdom as a control. For both games, we told participants that the program is useful
in stimulating brain activity and that those who perform well on this task should also
perform well on the following task. Unlike the Anti-Phishing Phil training module,
Fishdom does not have a natural end. Therefore we instructed participants to inform the
experimenter once they complete level three. This amount of time played approximately
coincides with the length of the Anti-Phishing Phil program.
For the next section, participants were asked to identify whether each of six
emails was a phishing attack or not, as well as report their level of confidence about their
choice. As a conformity manipulation, half of the participants were told that 90% of
previous participants rated the emails as non-phishing, but the other half were not given
any information on previous participants’ responses. The emails were displayed online,
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and the conformity manipulation was displayed below the email as a reminder of the
information given by the experimenter (Figure 2.4). Upon completion of that task,
participants provided their demographic information, and were debriefed in a letter at the
end of the survey as well as by the experimenter.
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Chapter Three
Results
The pretest was added to the experiment in order to determine the participants’ prior
knowledge of phishing attacks. Participants were scored on their number of correct
choices out of 13. Each of the 10 URLs and the “none of the above” option were scored
as individual items along with the following two questions. The highest score anyone
received was 10 and the lowest was 4.
First we conducted an omnibus ANCOVA using training, conformity, and form as
the between variables, and the pretest as the covariate. We conducted the omnibus
ANCOVA separately for accuracy as the dependent variable and then confidence as the
dependent variable. The results of this analysis are shown in tables 3.1 and 3.2
To test Hypothesis 1, we compared trained participants to untrained participants
in their accuracy, which is shown in Table 3.1. As seen in Table 3.1, the interaction was
not significant. Participants who received training did not perform significantly better in
the email identification task than those who did not receive training. The means and
standard deviations can be found in Table 3.3 below. The hypothesis was not supported.
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Table 3.1
Omnibus ANCOVA: Accuracy as the Dependent Variable
Independent Variable

F

df

p

Type

0.08

1, 82

0.77

Type x Pretest

0.00

1, 82

0.98

Type x Training

0.35

1, 82

0.55

Type x Conformity

0.01

1, 82

0.91

Type x Form

0.04

1, 82

0.84

Type x Training x Conformity

0.00

1, 82

0.96

Type x Training x Form

1.95

1, 82

0.17

Type x Conformity x Form

1.24

1, 82

0.27

Type x Training x Conformity x Form

0.56

1, 82

0.46
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Table 3.2
Omnibus ANCOVA: Confidence as the Dependent Variable
Independent Variable

F

df

p

Type

0.01

1. 82

0.95

Type x Pretest

0.17

1, 82

0.68

Type x Training

1.87

1, 82

0.18

Type x Conformity

3.33

1, 82

0.07

Type x Form

0.19

1, 82

0.67

Type x Training x Conformity

0.25

1, 82

0.62

Type x Training x Form

0.49

1, 82

0.49

Type x Conformity x Form

0.89

1, 82

0.35

Type x Training x Conformity x Form

5.85

1, 82

0.02
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Table 3.3
Means for Omnibus ANCOVA
Independent Variable

M1

Training

Received

SD 1

M2

SD 2

Did Not Receive

Dependent Variable
Accuracy (hits)

2.34

0.83

2.14

0.95

Accuracy (correct rejection)

2.09

0.74

2.06

0.73

Confidence (phishing)

5.45

1.07

4.94

1.24

Confidence (non-phishing)

5.44

0.86

4.63

1.07

Conformity

Received

Did Not Receive

Dependent Variable
Accuracy (hits)

2.24

0.97

2.24

0.82

Accuracy (correct rejection)

2.08

0.75

2.06

0.72

Confidence (confidence phishing)

5.20

1.29

5.17

1.08

Confidence (confidence non-phishing)

4.85

1.02

5.21

1.06

Form

A

B

Dependent Variable
Accuracy (hits)

2.24

0.99

2.24

0.80

Accuracy (correct rejection)

2.10

0.79

2.00

0.67

Confidence (phishing)

5.11

1.26

5.26

1.11

Confidence (non-phishing)

4.98

1.12

5.07

0.98
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To test Hypothesis 2 we compared trained participants to untrained participants in
the reported level of confidence in their selections in an email identification task. As seen
in Table 3.2, a significant interaction of Type x Training x Conformity x Form was
found, but no other interactions were significant. The means and standard deviations can
be found in Table 3.3. Furthermore, participants who received reported a significantly
higher level of confidence (M = 5.45, SD = 0.82) training in their selection than those
who did not receive training (M = 4.78, SD = 1.06) when the dependent variable was total
average confidence, F (1,82) = 10.47, p = .002. The hypothesis was supported. A follow
up analysis was conducted to determine if accuracy correlated with confidence in the
email task. The Pearson r was not significant r (89) = 0.18, p = .08.
To test Hypothesis 3 we conducted a t-test comparing untrained participants
presented with conformity information (M = 2.92, SD = 1.47) to untrained participants
not presented with conformity information (M = 2.91, SD = 1.08) in their frequency of
non-phishing choices. No significant results were found t (45) = 0.01, p = .99. We found
no significant difference between untrained participants presented with conformity
information and untrained participants not presented with conformity information in their
frequency of non-phishing choices. The hypothesis was not supported.
We also conducted a t-test comparing trained participants presented with
conformity information (M = 2.77 SD = 1.41) to untrained participants presented with
conformity information (M = 2.91 SD = 1.47) in their frequency of non-phishing choices
in an email identification task. No significant results were found t (44) = -0.34, p = .74.
We found no significant difference between trained participants presented with
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conformity information and untrained participants presented with conformity information
in their frequency of non-phishing choices.
To test Hypothesis 4 we conducted a t-test comparing trained participants
presented with conformity information (M = 5.48, SD = 1.13) to untrained participants
presented with conformity information (M = 4.93, SD = 1.38) in the reported level of
confidence in their selections of phishing emails in an email identification task, t (44) =
1.48 p = .15. We found no significant difference between trained participants presented
with conformity information and untrained participants presented with conformity
information in their level of confidence. The hypothesis was not supported.
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Chapter 4
Discussion
In this experiment we wanted to know whether training would improve people’s
ability to identify phishing emails. We also wanted to know if presenting people with
false information about others’ choices in order to elicit a conformity response would
reduce people’s ability to identify phishing emails. There were no significant results in
the overall analysis for accuracy. As expected, the form condition, created for
counterbalancing purposes, did not yield significant results, but neither did training nor
presenting participants with conformity information.
There are a few possible reasons why we found no significant results in
participants’ accuracy in the email identification task. First, the email identification task
may have been too easy for untrained individuals. This is supported by only 5% of our
participants getting less than half of the emails correct and 78% scoring a four out of six
or higher. Second, it is possible that the ease of which participants’ were able to correctly
distinguish these emails coupled with the small number of emails presented to
participants reduced our variability too much to obtain a pronounced effect. This is
supported by previous studies using larger sets of items in their tests when they found
significant results (Kumaraguru et al., 2010). It is possible that had we included a larger
number of trickier emails we would have seen an effect in the training condition both in
the overall analysis and in the ANCOVA for hypothesis 1. We find it less likely that the
conformity manipulation would benefit from a similar increase due to the means and
22

standard deviations of those presented with conformity information being nearly
indistinguishable to those not presented with conformity information.
When the dependent variable was confidence, significant results in the overall
analysis were found, but not in any of the individual factors. It is difficult to determine
why this factor and only this factor was significant. A possible reason this could have
happened is if the types of emails in the form condition were somehow grouped in a way
that makes them distinct. Bank of America, Citi, and Verizon were always grouped
together and Amazon, Ebay, and Chase were always grouped together. Leblanc and
Biddle (2012) conducted a study on online risk that may shed some light on the issue.
Participants rated the perceived likelihood and severity of the loss of personal
information on a number of factors including online banking and online shopping.
Participants in Leblanc and Biddle’s (2012) study rated the likelihood of being phished
almost the same but the severity of being phished was rated as higher for online banking.
Perhaps in our study, this perceived greater risk in severity, combined with training and
conformity information had an effect on participants’ confidence from form A where
predominantly banking websites were phishing (bank of America and citi), to form B
where predominantly shopping websites were phishing (ebay and amazon). In Figure 4.1,
we see that our lowest level of confidence for our email selection task was for the nonphishing versions of the Amazon, Ebay, and Chase items, where the participants received
conformity information, but no training. The highest level of confidence was when
participants received training but no conformity information on the same items. These
results are along the lines of our hypotheses stating training will increase levels of
confidence while conformity information will decrease levels of confidence.
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Mean Overall Confidence
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A

B

A

B

Conform No Conform Conform No Conform Conform No Conform Conform No Conform
Training

No Training

Training
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For hypothesis 1 we failed to reject the null hypothesis. As stated above, the likely
reason this was the case is that our emails may have been too easy for untrained
participants to detect and/or we presented too few of them to participants. This is backed
up by our participants scoring high on the identification task regardless of condition.
For hypothesis 2 a significant effect of training and confidence was discovered.
Trained participants reported significantly higher levels of confidence than untrained
participants when total average confidence was used as a dependent variable. A follow up
analysis was conducted to determine if there was a correlation between accuracy and
confidence. The follow up analysis did not show a significant correlation. Considering
the high scores on the email identification task, this suggests the significance found is
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most likely an indicator of trained participants knowing the answer whereas untrained
participants simply guessed correctly.
For hypothesis 3, we could not find a significant difference between trained
participants presented with conformity information and untrained participants presented
with conformity information in number of non-phishing choices. Again this is possibly
due to the emails being easy to identify so even the untrained participants were not
influenced by the conformity information
For hypothesis 4, we could not find a significant difference between the
confidence levels of trained participants presented with conformity information and the
confidence levels of untrained participants presented with conformity information in their
selections of phishing emails in an email identification task. A possible reason this
occurred was that the conformity information may not have been instantly trusted. This
was the case for some of the experiments (Asch, 1955; Sherif, 1937). If this were the
case, then our small number of emails may have limited the effect of conformity because
resisting the urge to conform once would be measured as resisting for a significant
portion of the experiment even if they were actually prone to conform.
Limitations
The major limitations of the study were the small number of emails presented to
the participants. It is also likely that we did not find what we were looking for because
the emails were not personal to the participant. In some studies (Coronges et al., 2012;
Dodge et al., 2007; Wright & Marett, 2010) the researchers had participants use their
personal computers and would have phishing emails sent to the user’s personal inbox.
This could have possibly added and element of urgency and personalization which could
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have resulted in lower scores in untrained participants. A limitation with our conformity
manipulation is that conformity does not always occur instantly, but instead takes a few
times for participants to succumb to the pressure, as noted by some participants in the
Asch (1955) study. It is possible that we simply did not present participants with enough
emails for participants to fall victim to the influence of our fabricated data.
Future Research
Future studies could likely find significant results via training programs like Antiphishing Phil, but they should use a larger number of emails and ensure those emails are
sufficiently challenging before doing so. Our biggest mistake was not pilot testing our
emails, so that would be recommended to all future researchers. Also, future researchers
should increase the number and difficulty of phishing emails presented. It could be
interesting for future studies to research the susceptibility of participants to phishing
attacks based on type of phishing email, such as one from a bank or a shopping website.
Other psychological constructs besides conformity could be explored. For
example authority and compliance have been used in other phishing experiments
(Coronges, 2012; Dodge, 2007), but these constructs have not been directly compared to
conformity or other psychological constructs in their effectiveness in phishing attacks. It
is possible that a different construct besides conformity would be a more effective
construct to explore in a phishing context. However, that may not be possible to
determine until a study is completed where the presented emails are challenging enough
for participants to miss without an added variable.
In the end, it is good that our participants did not fall victim to the real phishing
emails and URLs presented, because they likely will not be phished as easily as other
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members of the population. However, it only takes one slip, one rogue click, or one lapse
of judgment for someone to lose their personal information. Furthermore, at the alarming
rate new phishing attacks and malware are created, it is just a matter of time before that
person encounters another attack. That is why training is a vital line of defense for the
user.
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APPENDIX A

IRB APPROVAL LETTER
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APPENDIX B

PHISHING KNOWLEDGE SURVEY

1. How knowledgeable are you when it comes to phishing and phishing attacks?
Not at all
Very Little
Somewhat
Moderate
Above Average
High
Extremely
2. Have you or someone you know been a victim of a phishing attack? That is, were
there negative consequences?
Yes
No
3. Indicate which URLs, if any, are phishing.
https://www.chase.com
(phish)http://147.91.75.1/ebay/
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http://barclays.co.uk
(phish)http://ebay.com.verification.co.uk
http://www2.panasonic.com
(phish)http://secure.regionsnet.bowup.net
(phish)http://member.bankofthewest-online.com
https:/www.bankofthewest.com/BOW
(phish)http://www.paypal-ssl.com
(phish)http://click3.ebay.com/115252939.62506.0.87986
None of these are phishing

4. Which of the following represents the owner of the URL?
http://www.research.ibm.com/software/htp/cics/index.html
Research
Ibm (correct)
Software
Htp
Cics
index
5. If you are unsure of whether or not a URL sent to you in an email is phishing,
what should you do to find out about it?
Open the link in a new window
Type the address in a search engine (correct)
Avoid the address completely
Reply to the email
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